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Of Immovables, Component Parts, Societal Expectations, and
the Forehead of Zeus*
A.N. Yiannopoulos"
I. INTRODUCTION
Things are the objects of property law.' However, the word "things" has not
been defined by legislation,2 and the elaboration on the notion of things has been a
task undertaken by jurisprudence and doctrine. In general, a thing may be an object
consisting of one substance, such as a bar of gold, or of a mixture of substances, such
as a chemical compound or an organic product. Things of this kind are termed
"single." However, a thing may also be an object consisting of an assembly of
individual things, termed "component parts," that have been united to form a whole,
such as a computer or an automobile. Things of this kind are termed "composite."
In all legal systems, a thing may lose its identity and become a
component part of another thing.' For example, certain movables may be
merged into or become component parts of an immovable. When this
happens, the component parts of the immovable cease to be distinct things;
they become parts of a composite thing. This carries significant legal
consequences in various fields of law, including seizure,4 security rights in
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* According to Greek mythology, the Goddess Athena was born fully grown and armed when
Hepheastus hit with a hatchet the top of the head of Zeus (rather than his forehead). See Pindar, The
Odes of Pindar 75 (Sir John Sandys, trans., Putnam's Sons 2d ed. 1919) (1915) ("[B]y the cunning art
of Hephaestus, at the stroke of the brazen hatchet, Athene leapt from the crest of her father's head, and
cried aloud with a mighty shout, while Heaven and Mother Earth trembled before her."). For the
mythology of"Societal Expectations" and birth from the forehead of mere mortals, see infra notes 127-
138 and accompanying text.
This essay is dedicated with warm affection and admiration to Dean Symeon Symeonides of
Willamette University Law School, Professor Emeritus of Louisiana State University Law School. He
is a man of many talents and accomplishments (distinguished jurist, acclaimed author in diverse fields
of law, draftsman of the first codification of conflicts of law in North America, beloved teacher, and
efficient administrator). His publications in the field of Civil Law Property are monuments of the
Louisiana civilian tradition and authoritative guides for the proper interpretation and application of the
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code. Xatpe Koutlnape!
** Eason Weinmann Professor of Law, Tulane University; Professor Emeritus, Louisiana State
University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. Special thanks are due to Ms. Amy Allums, who did the spade
work for and editing of this essay. Her critical comments provided the needed testing of ideas before
publication.
1. See 2 Yiannopoulos, Property § 2, at 3, in Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991).
2. But see La. Civ. Code art. 448 (1870), repealed in the 1978 Revision. For explanation, see
Louisiana Civil Code, Book II, Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership, Title 1; Things,
Exposi des Motifs, 3 La. Civ. Code Ann. 3-4 (1980).
3. The division of things into single and composite is important in the light of the legal
consequences attached to the classification of a thing as a component part. See 2 Yiannopoulos,
Property § 31, at 55, in Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991).
4. See Straus v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928); Falin v. J.J. Stovall
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movables,5 real actions,6 successions,' community property,' lesion,9 leases,' °
insurance," venue, 2 expropriation, 3 and actions for damages.'
4
The question of whether a thing is a component part of an immovable
or a distinct movable may, therefore, arise in a variety of cases and contexts.
This question may be resolved by governing provisions of law, unilateral
declarations,' 3  and contractual agreements.' 6  Detailed provisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code deal with the definition 7 and ownership of component parts"
as well as the effect of the classification of a thing as a component part of another
thing.' 9 Article 469 of the Civil Code declares generally that "[t]he transfer or
encumbrance of an immovable includes its component parts."'2 This provision is
permissive (suppletive), 2' namely, it is applicable in the absence of other party
agreement.
Unfortunately, parties do not always take care to determine by agreement the
status of the things that are attached to a building and frequently face the need for
recourse to justice. Courts are then called upon to interpret contracts in the light of
the governing legislation, guided by jurisprudence and doctrine. Attempts are made
to determine party intent in the light of obscure language but, almost unavoidably,
& Sons, 141 La. 220, 74 So. 911 (1917); Tison v. Taniehill, 28 La. Ann. 793 (1876); Beard v.
Duralde, 23 La. Ann. 284 (1871); Schulingkamp v. Heaton, 455 So. 2d 1181 QLa. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 460 So. 2d 1045 (1984) (taxation).
5. See Woodward v. American Exposition Ry. Co., 39 La. Ann. 566,2 So. 413 (1887); Miller
v. Michoud, 11 Rob. 225 (La. 1845); State v. Mexican Gulf Ry. Co., 3 Rob. 513 (La. 1843).
6. See Scardino v. Maggio, 15 La. App. 444, 131 So. 217 (1st Cir. 1931).
7. See Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193 (1896); Rosata v. Cali, 4 So. 2d 54
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1941); Boykin v. Boykin, 4 La. App. 210 (2d Cir. 1926).
8. See Dillon v. Dillon, 35 La. Ann. 92 (1883); Lafleur v. Sylvester, 135 So. 2d 91 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961).
9. See Stanfa v. Bynum, 37 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. La. 1941).
10. See Gauche Realty Co. v. Janssen, 158 La. 379, 104 So. 122, 39 A.L.R. 1042 (1925);
DiCrispino v. Bares, 5 Orl. App. 69 (La. App. 1908).
11. See Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146 So. 35 (1933);
Dougherty v. Yazoo & M.V. R. Co., 9 La. App. 295, 119 So. 543 (1st Cir. 1928).
12. See Bowers v. Roman Catholic Church of Diocese of New Orleans, 264 So. 2d 329 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 262 La. 1152, 266 So. 2d 441 (1972).
13. See U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987); State Dep't.
of Highways v. Blair, 285 So. 2d 212 (La. 1973) (trees, shrubs, flowers).
14. See Heater v. Texas Gas & Exploration Corp., 466 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985);
Simmons v. Board of Comm'rs for the Port of New Orleans, 442 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983);
Versai Management, Inc. v. Monticello Forest Prods. Corp., 479 So. 2d 477 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985)
(timber). But see Morris v. Pratt, 114 La. 98, 38 So. 70 (1905).
15. See La. Civ. Code art. 467 (immovables by declaration).
16. See, e.g., Ligon v. Angus, 485 So. 2d 142 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (stipulation that the seller
would retain a chandelier and a mirror that were attached to the house).
17. See La. Civ. Code arts. 465-467.
18. Id. arts. 491-497.
19. Id. arts. 469, 498.
20. Id. art. 469.
21. For the distinction between permissive and mandatory provisions of law, see Yiannopoulos,
Civil Law System, Louisiana and Comparative Law § 116, at 222-23 (2d ed. 1998).
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the question of whether a particular thing is a component part of a building is
determined in light of the provisions of the Civil Code rather than the party
agreement.
After the 1978 Revision, Louisiana courts interpreting the provisions of the Civil
Code governing component parts of buildings have not encountered serious
conceptual difficulties and have generally reached plausible results. However, a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has contradicted
established precepts, deviated from well settled jurisprudence, and has given
rise to uncertainty.22 The following discussion is an effort to reexamine the
Louisiana law governing the classification of a thing as a component part of a
building in the absence of contractual provisions determining that matter and to
restore confidence.
II. THE LAW THAT IS
Book II, Title 1, of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. "Of Things," was
revised and reenacted in 1978.23 A movable may become a component part
of an immovable and, therefore, be subject to the laws governing immovable
property by application of Articles 465, 466, and 467. Article 465 contem-
plates things that are fully incorporated into a tract of land, a building, or
other construction so as to become an integral part of it, such as building
materials.24 Article 466 governs things that, though not incorporated into a
building or other construction, become component parts by virtue of their
permanent attachment to the building or other construction." Article 467
governs things that may become component parts of an immovable by a recorded
declaration of the owner.26 Articles 465 and 467 have not given rise to difficult
questions of interpretation and will not be discussed here. Instead, attention will be
focused on Article 466, the interpretation and application of which has spawned a
gloss of jurisprudence and a body of legal literature.27 Article 466 declares:
22. See Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d 169(5th Cir. 1999); see
also infra notes 118-138 and accompanying text.
23. See 1978 La. Acts No. 728, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.
24. See La. Civ. Code art. 465. Revision Comment (c) indicates that incorporation is a question
of fact to be determined by the trier of facts. It may be regarded as established when movables lose their
identity or become an integral part of the immovable. Everything incorporated into a tract of land, a
building, or other construction, becomes immovable without regard to ownership. Comment (d)
indicates that Immobilization under this article is inoperative when the law provides otherwise. See La.
R.S. 9:5357 (1991), 9:1106 (2000). Butsee Lakeside Nat'l Bank of Lake Charles v. Moreaux, 576 So.
2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 466.
26. See La. Civ. Code art. 467.
27. See Lee Hargrave, Property, Development in the Law 1988-1989,50 La. L. Rev. 353 (1989);
Symeon Symeonides, Property Developments in the Law 1984-1985, 46 La. L. Rev. 655 (1986); M.
Charles Wallfisch, Property-Permanent Attachment-The Chandeliers Case, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 440
(1986); Amy Allums, Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indem. Co: How a Small Hotel Made a Big
Difference in the Component Part Concept, 74 Tul. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2000).
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Things permanently attached to a building or other construction, such as
plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations, are its
component parts.
Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be removed
without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable to which
they are attached.2"
III. THE LAW THAT WAS
The 1978 Revision of the laws governing movables and immovables was not
made on a clean slate, and much of the pre-existing law was preserved in a new form.
Articles 467-469 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 governed the classification of
things that had been placed upon or attached to an immovable and, indirectly, the
status of those things as component parts of tracts of lands and buildings. These
articles were studied thoroughly and then revised. For a better understanding of the
scope and effect of the Revision, pertinent 1870 texts are reproduced below.
Article 467. Wire screens, water pipes, sewerage pipes, heating pipes,
radiators, electric wires, electric and gas lighting fixtures, bathtubs,
lavatories, closets, gasplants, meters and electric fight plants, heating plants
and furnaces, when actually connected with or attached to the building by
the owner for the use or convenience of the building are immovable by their
nature.
Article 468 [last paragraph]. All such movables as the owner has attached
permanently to the tenement or to the building, are likewise immovables by
destination.
Article 469. The owner is supposed to have attached to the tenement or to
the building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with plaster
or mortar, or such as can not be taken off without being broken or injured,
or without breaking or injuring the part of the building to which they are
attached.
A. Interpretation and Application of Article 467: Things "Connected with or
Attached to a Building"
Originally, Article 467 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided that "the
pipes made use of for the purpose of bringing water to a house or other estate, are
immovable, and are part of the tenement to which they are attached." To resolve a
controversy as to whether that article could be applied by analogy to non-enumerated
things, an amendment was passed by the Louisiana Legislature in 1912 that produced
the lengthy list.29 Subsequently, it was correctly held that the enumeration was




indicative rather than exclusive.3" Accordingly, Louisiana courts classified as parts
of a building a steam heating system, 31 a hot water heater,32 a safe,33 doors,34 and a
butane gas system.
35
Under Article 467, the test for the classification of a thing as a part of a building
was connection with or attachment to the building by the owner for the use or
convenience of the building. This test of use or convenience was sufficiently broad
to include almost anything imaginable and in part overlapped with the last paragraph
of Article 468. However, under Article 467, the enumerated things were immovables
if they were merely "connected with or attached" to the building; permanent
attachment was not a requisite. 6 In contrast, according to Article 468, permanent
attachment was required for the classification of a thing as a part of an immovable.
Article 469 established a presumption of permanent attachment when things were
attached with plaster or mortar or when they could not be separated from the
immovable without injury.
In Lafleur v. Foret,37 a landmark decision, the court faced, inter alia, the
question of whether certain air conditioning units were movables or
immovables. If movables, the air conditioning units should belong to plaintiff, seller
of a house; if immovables, in the absence of contrary stipulation in the contract of
sale, they should pass to the purchaser. In a well documented opinion, Judge Tate
reexamined the legislative basis of immobilization and its relevance in the
light of contemporary practices and demands. The window air conditioners,
the court decided, were and remained movables. There was no "permanent
attachment" under the last paragraph of Article 468 or under Article 469 of
the 1870 Code, and, therefore, attention was focused on possible immobilization
under Article 467.
Turning to Article 467, the court held that the enumeration of immovables was
merely illustrative and that the list could be expanded to include things not
enumerated. Since air conditioners were not enumerated, and the parties did not take
care to specify their subjective intent, the court focused on the tests of immobiliza-
tion furnished by Article 467 in light of "societal expectations, 33 an objective
standard. In accord with house construction practices, and taking into account the
air conditioners' degree of connection with the building, the court decided in favor
of the seller of the house.
30. See Scott v. Brennan, 161 La. 1017, 109 So. 822, 48 A.L.R. 1143 (1926).
31. See Pettyv. Jones, 10 La. App. 409, 121 So. 372 (Orl. 1929).
32. SeeScottv.Brennan, 161 La. 1017,1019-20, 109So.822,823,48A.L.R. 1143(1926). The
court also declared that "bathtubs, lavatories, closets, and sinks, connected with the water pipes in a
building, are unquestionably immovable by nature...." Id.
33. See Folger v. Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436 (1872).
34. See W.M. Bailey & Sons v. W. Geophysical Co., 66 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
35. See Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So. 2d 525 (La. App. lstCir. 1945). See also Holicer Gas
Co. v. Wilson, 45 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
36. See Gordon A. Pugh, Comment, Immovables by Nature UnderArticle 467 of the Civil Code,
20 La. L. Rev. 410,412 (1960).
37. 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
38. Id. at 147-48.
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B. Interpretation and Application of Articles 468 and 469: "Permanent
Attachment"
It was not entirely clear in the pre-1978 jurisprudence what constituted
"permanent attachment" under Articles 468 and 469 of the Civil Code. The owner's
intent to make a movable a component part of an immovable seemed to be material,
but it did not suffice; an overt act by the owner or on his behalf was necessary.39 In
most instances, intention to immobilize was gathered from a factual finding of sturdy
physical attachment.4" Permanent attachment did not mean for "perpetuity or
eternity, ' 41 and was distinguishable from the incorporation of a movable into an
immovable.42
Louisiana courts were not always consistent in their interpretation and
application of Articles 468 and 469 of the 1870 Code. In some cases, Article 469
was thought to furnish the only possible method of permanent attachment. 43 In other
cases, the same article was regarded as merely illustrative of the methods that could
be used.44 Accordingly, it was held that the provisions of Article 469 did not limit
the general rule of Article 468, and that "when none of the presumptions established
by Article 468 exist, the fact may be shown by any competent evidence." 4 The
preferable view was that Articles 468 and 469 contemplated distinguishable
situations and that permanent attachment could be effected in several ways and by
different methods.46 When the methods of attachment conformed to the tests of
Article 469, the intention of the owner was immaterial, and immobilization was
considered proven. When immobilization was claimed apart from the methods of
Article 469, permanent attachment could still be proved by reference to the
intent of the owner and overt acts manifesting that intent.
Quite frequently, the question of permanent attachment was resolved in
light of two considerations: the identification of a thing as movable and the
facility of its removal. Things that were identifiable and easily removable, like
39. But see Bon Air Planting Co. v. Barringer, 142 La. 60, 76 So. 234 (1917).
40. See Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915).
41. Coguenhem v. Troselair, 137 La. 985, 992, 69 So. 800, 802 (1915).
42. But see Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1927). In that case
the court found that a gas tank and other articles were "merged into the immovable" and had "become
so far a part of it as to lose entirely the character of movables." Id.
43. But see Richardson v. Item Co., 172 La. 421,134 So. 380(1931); L'Hote v. Fulham, 51 La.
Ann. 780, 25 So. 655 (1899); Dixie Bldg. Material Co. v. Chartier, 8 La. App. 469 (Orl. 1928); Day
v. Goff, 2 La. App. 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1925).
44. Scovel, 137 La. at 922,69 So. at 746.
45. Id. See also Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717 (1850) (under corresponding provisions of the
1825 Code).
46. See Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana 159 (1925):
There have been a great many controversies as to what connection may be deemed
permanent. One thing is certain, that what the Code says on the subject (469) is by way of
explanation only. When the Code says whatever is connected by plaster or by mortar is a
part of it, [sic]. Is only an illustration of the permanent union between the thing and the
house, and it admits of other methods of union which will be deemed to be permanent.
[Vol. 601384
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refrigeration equipment in a building,47 machinery in a sugar factory,4" an ice
crusher,49 an oil burner,5°a soda fountain in a drug store,5 and chandeliers 2 in a
residence were not component parts of an immovable. However, things that
were identifiable but not easily removable were considered to be parts of an
immovable. It was so held in cases involving a gas tank,53 valuable mirrors,' a
safe,5" and chandeliers in a residence forming part of an electrical and gas installa-tion.56
IV. ARTICLE 466 AND GHOSTS OF THE PAST
In the 1978 Revision, the statement of sources under Article 466 reads:
"New; cf C.C. art. 469; but see C.C. arts. 467, 468.""7 This cryptic statement may
be deciphered with the help of the Revision Comments that accompany
Article 466. Comment (a) states that this provision is new, that it is based
in part on Article 469 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, and that it
changes the law.5" Comment (c) explains that the second paragraph of Article
468 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, things that the owner of a tract of
land or a building had permanently attached to it became immovables by
destination. In the revision, however, the category of immovable by destination was
suppressed and the requirement of unity of ownership ceased to be material.
Accordingly, under the 1978 Revision, "things permanently attached to a building
or other construction are immovables even if they belong to a predial lessee or other
person."59
Further, Comment (d) explains that according to Article 467 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, things that the owner of a building had "attached to or actually
connected with" the building for its "use or convenience" were "immovables by
nature." In the Revision, unity of ownership of the building and of the movables is
no longer required; "moreover, the test of use or convenience of the building is
abrogated. Immobilization takes place under [a]rticle 466 when movables are
permanently attached to a building or other construction."6
47. See Hamilton Co. v. Med. Arts Bldg. Co., 17 La. App. 508, 135 So. 94 (2d Cir. 1931). See
also Baldwin v. Young, 47 La. Ann. 1466, 17 So. 883 (1895) (heater "detachable without injury").
48. See Folse v. Loreauville Sugar Factory, 156 So. 667 (La. App. I stCir. 1934). See also Carlin
v. Gordy, 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880); Lapene & Jacks v. McCan & Son, 28 La. Ann. 749 (1876).
49. See Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
50. See Succession of Sussman, 168 La. 349, 122 So. 62 (1929).
51. See Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Crow, 177 La. 379, 148 So. 442 (1933).
52. See McGuigin v. Boyle, I Orl. App. 164 (La. App. 1904). See also L'Hote v. Fulham, 51 La.
Ann. 780, 25 So. 655 (1899).
53. See Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
54. See Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717 (1850).
55. See Folger v. Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436 (1872).
56. See Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915).
57. See La. Civ. Code art. 466.
58. See La. Civ. Code art. 466, Revision Comment (a).
59. La. Civ. Code art. 466, Revision Comment (c).
60. La. Civ. Code art. 466, Revision Comment (d).
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Still further, comment (e) under new Article 466 points out that, in contrast with
the provisions of Articles 467 and 468 that were abrogated, the substance of Article
469 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 "has been reproduced" and that "Louisiana
jurisprudence interpreting Article 469, therefore, continues to be relevant.",61
As under the 1870 Code, things such as "plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical
or other installations" that are permanently attached to a building are its component
parts." However, in contrast with the prior law, those things may become
component parts of a building without regard to the test of use or convenience of the
building, even ifthey are attached by a non-owner. The category of component parts
ofa building has been narrowed by the suppression of the detailed list of immovables
of prior Article 467, but at the same time it has been expanded by the elimination of
the requirements of use or convenience of the building and unity of ownership. To
supplement that give and take, the easily satisfied requirement of attachment to or
connection with the building has been replaced by the much more onerous
requirement of permanent attachment. As under the prior law, the things that are
illustratively enumerated in the first paragraph of Article 466 are considered to be
permanently attached as a matter of law, 63 that is, without regard to the test of the
second paragraph of Article 466. As to such things, facility of removal is immaterial.
Article 466, second paragraph, determines what constitutes permanent
attachment with respect to things that are not covered by the first paragraph. Like
Article 469 of the 1870 Code from which has been derived, it declares that things are
considered permanently attached if they cannot be removed without substantial
damage to themselves or to the thing to which they are attached.64 This is an
objective test; the intent of the owner of the building or other construction is
immaterial. The degree of connection or attachment of things to a building raises a
factual issue.6 However, the classification of things as component parts of a
61. See La. Civ. Code art. 466, Revision Comment (e). For exceptional legislation that prevents
immobilization under Article 469, see Comments (f) and (g).
62. See La.Civ. Code art. 466; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (light fixtures and carpeting held to be component parts of a building under
Article 466); Berot v. Norcondo Partnership, 544,So. 2d 508 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (carpet, tile.
flooring, wall paper, ceiling fans and burglar alarm held to be component parts of condominium unit);
see Wallfisch, supra note 27. For things which, under special legislation, may not become component
parts of an immovable, see Yiannopoulos, supra note 1, § 124, at 280.
63. See U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361, 368 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[A]s
a matter of law, certain things are deemed to be permanently attached if they are so classified in the first
paragraph [of Article 466].").
64. For things that did not become component parts of a building, see Simmons v. Board of
Comm'rs for Port of New Orleans, 442 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (gate and fence attached
to wharf); Heater v. Texas Gas & Exploration Corp., 466 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (scaffold
in a drilling platform); Steele v. Helmerich & Payne Intern. Drilling Co., 738 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1984)
("stabbing board"); White v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 525 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (elevator
tower attached to exterior of building under construction). In US. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987), the court held that certain electrical transformers, originally
belonging to New Orleans Public Service, became component parts of a building and ownership passed
to the owner of the building. Hence, the utility could not be held liable for contamination of the
environment by the transformers under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
65. Thus, a window air-conditioning unit may or may not be permanently attached to the
1386 [Vol. 60
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building or other construction is a legal conclusion that is necessarily drawn from
pertinent facts.' As under the prior law, permanent attachment does not mean
attachment "perpetuity or eternity. ' 67 Permanent attachment may be effected in a
variety of ways; the use of plaster or cement is neither required nor determinative of
permanent attachment.
V. ARTICLE 466 IN THE COURTS
A. A Cause C9l9bre: Equibank v. United States
In Equibank v. United States,' the owner of a mansion on St. Charles Avenue
in New Orleans defaulted on his mortgage and also failed to pay his income taxes.
The mortgage was foreclosed and the mansion, with its contents, was advertised for
sale. However, the IRS obtained possession of the mansion and removed furniture
and certain valuable antique chandeliers over which it claimed a tax lien.69 The
mortgage holders sought irunctive relief against the IRS, and the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was faced with the question of
whether the chandeliers were movable property subject to the tax lien or component
parts of the mansion subject to the mortgage.
Judge Frederick Heebe asked Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos in his capacity as
Reporter of the Civil Law Property Revision Committee of the Louisiana State Law
Institute to explain the process of revision and the changes made in the law. At the
trial, the Reporter explained that the first paragraph of Article 466 derived from
Article 467 of the 1870 Code, that the second paragraph of Article 466 derived from
Article 469 of the 1870 Code, and that the legislative intent was to preserve the
Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the source provisions. ° Further, the Reporter
explained that, in accordance with the prior jurisprudence, things enumerated in the
first paragraph of Article 466 are as a matter of law component parts of a building,
that is, without regard to the test of permanent attachment of the second paragraph
of the same article.7 In contrast, under the second paragraph of Article 466, things
are classified as component parts of a building on the basis of facts establishing
permanent physical attachment,72 that is, a finding that the things in question cannot
building. See Lafleur v. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
66. See White v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 525 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Vincent v. Gold,
261 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
67. Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 137 La. 985, 992,69 So. 800, 802 (1915).
68. 749 F.2d 1176(5th Cir. 1985).
69. Seeid.at1177.
70. See Testimony ofA.N. Yiannopoulos, Equibank v. I.R.S., 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985) (No.
83-4122); Record at 48-49, 60, Equibanx (No. 83-4122).
71. See id. at 60-61. But see U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.
1987).
72. See TestimonyofA.N. Yiannopoulos, Equibankv. U.S. I.R.S., 749 F.2d 1176(5th Cir. 1985)
(No. 83-4122); Record at 63, Equibank (No. 83-4122). Of course, the determination of "permanent
attachment" under the second paragraph of Article 466 is a legal conclusion drawn from pertinent facts.
Louisiana courts have held that these words do not contemplate atttachment in perpetuity. But see
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be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the building. When asked
to express an opinion as to the status of the chandeliers that had been removed from
the mansion by the IRS, the Reporter stated that the chandeliers were movable
property under Louisiana jurisprudence."3 They were neither "electrical installa-
tions"' under the first paragraph of Article 466 nor "permanently attached" under
the second paragraph of the same article. Judge Heebe accepted these conclusions
as his own and rendered judgment dismissing the injunction.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In
determining whether the chandeliers were component parts of the house, the court
interpreted Article 466 as explained by the Reporter " and applied the first paragraph
of Article 466 independently of the second paragraph.76 However, contrary to the
Reporter's conclusion and prior Louisiana jurisprudence, the court concluded that
the chandeliers were "electrical installations" under the first paragraph of Article
466." Once this conclusion was reached, the court correctly did not dwell on the
question of whether the removal of the chandeliers would result in substantial
damage either to the chandeliers or to the mansion.
At the district court trial, the Reporter had explained that the Civil Code
provisions governing the classification of things as movables and immovables strive
Symeon Symeonides, Developments in the Law 1984-1985: Property, 46 La. L Rev. 655, 688 (1986).
73. See Testimony of A.N. Yiannopoulos, Equibankv. U.S. I.R.S., 749 F.2d 1176(5th Cir. 1985)
(No.83-4122); Record at 49-50, Equibank (No. 83-4122).
74. See L'Hote v. Fulham, 51 La. Ann. 780, 784, 787, 25 So. 655, 657-58 (La. 1899) stating:
The chandeliers and brackets placed in the houses of W.F. Fulham are also movables ....
Neither the chandeliers themselves, the pipes with which they are connected, nor the walls
through which the pipes are passed, are in the slightest degree injured by their removal....
We think thatj urisprudence generally recognizes that chandeliers placed in a dwelling house
by the owner thereof are movables, though, in order to be made use of, they have to be
connected with pipes which are themselves considered immovable by destination."
But see McGuigin v. Boyle, I Orl. App. 164 (La. App. 1904); Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918,
924, 69 So. 745, 747 (1915) (on rehearing). Scovel involved the question of whether chandeliers were
included in the sale of a house. Fulham was distinguished on the ground that the chandeliers were
easily removable In Scovel, the court held that:
the chandeliers and brackets were component parts of a gas and electricity installation that
was indisputably immovable property .... [T]hose things, in so far as they were intended
for the illumination of the house by the use of gas, were component parts of a plant
established in the cellar of the house for the manufacture of gas, and in so far as they were
for the use of electricity, were accessories of the electric light plant established by the same
owner in the nearby sugar house .... The question here is, whether the vendor of immovable
property, or those claiming under him, can recover from his vendee an essential part or
accessory of that property on the ground that it was not included in the sale. Our conclusion
is that he cannot.
137 La. at 931,69 So. at 750-51.
75. See Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1177-80. See also Moll v. Brown & Root, Inc., No. 97-2671,
1999 WL 155948, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 1999) ("By concluding that the chandeliers were
'permanently attached' even though they could be removed without substantial damage, the Equibank
Court necessarily accepted the interpretation of Article 466 given by Professor Yiannopoulos.").
76. See Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1179-80.
77. See id. at 1176. This was an innovation. For the meaning of "electrical installations," see
Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915).
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for maximum certainty and predictability but uncertainties may exist in the fringes,
and that in certain circumstances classification is made according to ideas and
conceptions prevailing in society." For example, the societal viewpoint may be
relevant when determining the classification of things that are not clearly enumerated
in the first paragraph of Article 466 and are not permanently attached under the
second paragraph.79
The Court of Appeals took a broad view and declared that "societal expecta-
tions" must be considered when determining which things the legislature meant to be
included in the listed categories of the first paragraph of Article 466.0° The court
determined as a matter of law that chandeliers and other electrical appliances and
fixtures"' may be "electrical installations" and then focused on the circumstances in
which such things become component parts of a building. A workable test was
devised: according to prevailing notions in society, things are "electrical installa-
tions" if they are connected to the interior wiring of the building and if some skill or
additional knowledge is required in order to connect them to, or disconnect them
from, a power source. 2 In contrast, simple plug-in units 3 are not electrical
installations." The court also reasoned that the legislature intended light fixtures to
be included in the category of electrical installations because the average, prudent
homebuyer expects the lights to go with the house." Therefore, the court concluded
that an installed light fixture, whether an antique chandelier or an everyday fixture,
78. See Testimony ofA.N. Yiannopoulos, Equibank v. U.S. I.R.S, 749 F.2d 1176(5th Cir. 1985);
Record at 50-51, Equibank (No. 83-4122).
79. See Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1180. Indeed, Article 466 may be applied by analogy to things
not expressly covered. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052,1055 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1988) (carpeting, light fixtures, and other electrical paraphernalia); Berot v. Norcondo
Partnership, 544 So. 2d 508, 511 (La.*App. 5th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e find it self evident that the carpet,
tile flooring, wallpaper, ceiling fans, and the burglar alarm constitute component parts of the
condominium."). It was the same under the prior law. See Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70
F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1934) ("A sprinkler system ... is not included in the enumeration of specified
appliances in either article [467 and 468], but, as the maxim 'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius' has
very little application in construing the articles of the Civil Code, it may be conceded that either article
is broad enough to include a sprinkling system by necessary implication." ) Id. at 141 (citing Scott v.
Brennan, 161 La. 1017, 109 So. 822 (1926).
80. See Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1179 (emphasis added).
81. But see U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987).
82. See Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1179.
83. See id. at 1179-80. The court listed such plug-in units as lamps, toasters, drills, and radios.
84. See id. The court stated that the average homebuyer expects to see the lights to go on when
he flips a switch, as opposed to seeing only a hole where light fixtures once were. Although the court
agreed with the Reporter that the societal view is relevant, it disagreed as to the societal view in this
case. The Reporter concluded that the average homebuyer would not expect a fine, antique chandelier
to go with the house because of its artistic and monetary value. The court, however, concluded that the
average homebuyer expects lights to go with the house, regardless of whether the light is a valuable
chandelier or an ordinary light fixture. Ironically, the court in Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909
(5th Cir. 1997), contrary to Equibank, found that the oil rig was not a component part because of its
great value and sophistication! See Equibank, 749 F.2d. at 180.
85. See Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1180. The court stated that the average homebuyer expects to see
the lights to go on when he flips a switch, as opposed to seeing only a hole where light fixtures once
were.
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is a component part of a building under the first paragraph of Article 466."6 The
Equibank court interpreted and applied the first paragraph of Article 466 of the
Louisiana Civil Code without due regard to prior jurisprudence 7 and the 1978
Revision Comments."8 However, this is not necessarily a fault, and the solution
reached by the court is plausible. Indeed, the Revision Comments are not law, and
according to civilian theory judicial decisions are neither binding precedents nor
sources of law. Undeterred by legislative history, the court attributed to the words
of the law a contemporary meaning in conformity with the method of free scientific
research. Francois G~ny and Justice Tate would have approved. 9
B. The Equibank Legacy
Equibank gave birth to a Louisiana jurisprudence constante: every Louisiana
court that dealt with the question of classification of things as component parts of
buildings relied on the Equibank reasoning and proceeded to the interpretation of
Article 466 in full accord with the seminal decision."e In In re Appeal of Chase
Manhattan Leasing Corp.,9' the question before the court was the classification of
the scoreboard and signage system of the Louisiana Superdome as movable property
subject to ad valorem taxation or tax-exempt as a component part of the building.
The court applied the Equibank analysis and test and held that these were component
parts of the Superdome under both the firse 2 and the second93 paragraph of Article
86. See id.
87. See supra notes 29-56 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
89. Francois Giny, Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private Positive Law (trans.,
Louisiana State Law Institute 2d ed. 1963); Albert Tate Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in
Louisiana, 22 La. L. Rev. 727 (1962).
90. See. e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1988). It decided that light fixtures "and related electrical paraphernalia" were component
parts under paragraph one of Article 466 because they were wired in rather than plugged in. In finding
carpeting to be a component part, the court echoed Equibank in stating that the reasonable buyer would
expect to have finished flooring upon taking possession. In Lakeside Nat'! Bank of Lake Charles v.
Moreaux, 576 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991), following Equibank, the court held that a septic
tank system and an air conditioning system were permanently attached under Article 466, and went on
to state that, "[m]oreover, we think that the question of whether... [they] should be considered an
integral component of the building... should be based on societal expectations, notions and needs of
the times." Id. at 1096 (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052 (La.
App. I st Cir. 1988)). In Berot v. Norcondo Partnership, 544 So. 2d 508, 511 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989),
following Equibank the court acknowledged that "ourjurisprudence ... has demonstrated that the test
is [societal expectations.]" It then found it self-evident that a burglar alarm system, flooring, ceiling
fans, and wallpaper were component parts of a condominium based on Article 466 and the
jurisprudence.
91. 626 So. 2d 433,434 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
92. See id. at 434. "Following the Equibank rationale," the court declared, "the first paragraph
of the article is satisfied because the system qualifies as an 'electrical or other installation' which is
permanently attached to the Superdome. The system accesses the Superdome's electrical energy source
through the interior wiring of the building. Furthermore, the system is connected to the Superdome
structure by welds, concrete, and steel attachments."
93. See id. "The second paragraph of La. Civ. Code art. 466 is also satisfied. Removing the
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466. In Hyman v. Ross,94 unpaid vendors of heating and air-conditioning units
installed in a previously mortgaged motel claimed a vendor's privilege on the
units adversely to the holders of the mortgage. The classification of the units
as component parts of the building would negate the vendor's privilege and
would enhance the security of the mortgage. In a well reasoned opinion, the
court, quoting from scholarly commentary95 and following Equibank, declared
that "the two paragraphs of Article 466 are separate and distinct, and should
be applied independently to determine whether a particular object is a
component part. ' The court dwelled on Professor Symeonides's explanation
that while the two paragraphs of Article 466 seem to be closely interdepen-
dent-the second paragraph giving the impression that it merely qualifies the
way in which the things listed in the first paragraph must be attached-a
literal application would be "historically and functionally incorrect" 97 and
quoted:
[T]he word "permanent" in that paragraph [paragraph one] is intended to
have a temporal rather than a physical connotation, i.e., permanent as
opposed to temporary, not permanent as opposed to loose attachment.
While a physically close attachment to, or incorporation into, the immov-
able usually connotes a certain degree of permanency in the temporal sense,
a loose attachment does not necessarily connote lack of permanency. A
loosely attached item of the kind enumerated in the first paragraph of
current article 466 or sufficiently analogous thereto, may well be viewed by
the community as permanently serving the immovable. If so, the item would
qualify as a component part of the building, even when the item is easily
removable and thus does not meet the rest of the second paragraph of
current article 466.9'
The Hyman court determined that heating and air conditioning units in rooms
were as a matter of law component parts of a motel building under the first paragraph
of Article 466. Echoing the analysis of Professor Symeonides, the court reasoned
that the units in question were attached "indefinitely," and, therefore, they were
permanently attached in a temporal sense.99 Further, following Equibank, the court
reasoned that according to societal expectations the units were component parts in
light of their indefinite attachment, their connection to the interior wiring of the
motel, and their installation that required skill and expertise." The court also
echoed Equibank as it considered what the average buyer would expect to see upon
scoreboard and signage system would probably cause substantial damage to both the system and the
Superdome. Attachments would have to be dislodged from concrete and from the building itself."
94. 643 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
95. See id. at 258-59 (citing 2 Yiannopoulos, Property § 142, at 312, in Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise (3d ed. 1991) and Symeonides, supra note 27, at 687-90.
96. Hyman, 643 So. 2d at 258.
97. Symeonides, supra note 27, 687.
98. Hyman, 643 So. 2d at 258 (quoting Symeonides, supra note 27, at 688).




the premises and concluded that he would not expect to see the large hole that would
be left if the units were removed. 10
Until 1999, federal courts in Louisiana interpreted and applied Article 466
substantially in accord with Equibank. 2 In Moll v. Brown & Root Inc.,°an injured
worker and his spouse claimed damages from an engineering fin on a products
liability theory. They claimed that the worker was injured by a defective muffler that
was attached to a piping line of a furnace on a seven story structure built on a
concrete foundation. The defendants argued that the muffler in question was a
component part of an immovable and that plaintiffs' claims were perempted under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2772. In a scholarly opinion, the court reexamined
Equibank as well as pertinent jurisprudence and doctrine and determined that the
muffler was a component part of an immovable. The court relied on Professor
Symeonides's elaboration on the meaning of' permanent attachment,"' 4 accepted the
view that the each paragraph of Article 466 should be interpreted independently of
the other, and following the Equibank analysis and test declared that the muffler had
been "permanently attached" to the immovable."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit revisited Article 466 in
United States Environmental Protection Agency v. New Orleans Public Service. 6
The court faced the question of the classification of three electrical transformers in
a brewery. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency had imposed
a civil penalty on NOPSI, an electric utility, under the Toxic Substances Control Act
for contamination from the transformers, and NOPSI petitioned for review claiming
that the transformers were not its property but were component parts of another
person's building.
In a well documented and incisive opinion, the court applied the Equibank
reasoning step by step"0 7 and concluded that, although the transformers did not meet
the permanent attachment test under the second paragraph of Article 466, they could
still be component parts as a matter of law under the first paragraph. The test of
permanent attachment under the second paragraph of Article 466 was thus
101. See id.
102. It might be argued that in Boggs v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. La. 1989),
the court did not follow the Equibank analysis of "other installations." That case involved a tort claim
by an injured worker on an oil rig located on a fixed platform resting on the outer continental shelf.
Plaintiff sought to recover damages from the owner of the platform on the theory that the oil rig was a
component part of the platform. The court declared: "Because it is undisputed that the H & P rig at issue
here could be and was removed without substantial damage to itself or to the platform to which it was
attached, it cannot be deemed part of the building owned by Arco for purposes of Article 2322
liability." Id. at 75.
103. No. 97-2671, 1999 WL 155948 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 1999).
104. Id. at *3.
105. See idat *3-5. Accord Miller v. Slam Offshore. 49 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. La. 1999). In this
tort action, an offshore platform worker claimed that he was injured by a defective lease automatic
custody transfer unit. On designer's motion for summary judgment, the court, following Equibank,
Moll, and similar cases, held that the question of the classification of the unit as a component part of
an immovable involved a genuine dispute as to facts and dismissed the motion.
106. 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987).
107. See id. at 463-65 (citing Wallfisch, supra note 27).
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immaterial.'08 The court then determined that according to societal expectations the
transformers were, indeed, electrical installations.' ° Noting that "no specific
evidence was presented as to how society would view these electrical transformers"
and that "[i]ndeed, no such evidence was present in Equibank," the court declared
that "[i]t would be absurd to require such testimony. Rather such a determination
can, and should be made by the trier of fact on a case by case basis.""
In Coulter v. Texaco,"' the claim was a frequently recurring one. An injured
worker on an oil drilling rig in a fixed platform in the outer continental shelf filed an
action for damages against the owner of the platform on the theory that the oil
drilling rig was a component part of the platform. In deciding this matter under the
governing law of Louisiana, Judge Wiener relied on the works of two Louisiana "law
scholars""' and emphasized that the two paragraphs of Article 467 contemplate
different categories of things and different tests. The court acknowledged that
"[i]ntermediate appellate courts in Louisiana have applied our Equibank 'ordinary
societal expectations' test in a number of cases.""' 3
After finding that the oil rig did not meet the substantial damage test of the
second paragraph of Article 466,' '4 the court turned to the first paragraph and
concluded that the societal expectations of the offshore oil and gas industry is that
a rig is not a component part of the platform.'" In the determination of societal
expectations, however, the court applied factors that were rejected in Equibank and
reasoned that the average person would expect the oil rig not to be a component part
because of its high cost and sophistication." 6 In contrast, the Equibank court
disregarded the chandeliers' cost and artistic value, and treated them like any other
light fixture that the average person expects to go with the house.' 7 Had the
Equibank court accepted the view that the value and artistic significance of the
chandeliers were pertinent considerations for resolution of the question of permanent
attachment, it should have concluded that, like the oil drilling rig in Coulter, the
chandeliers were not component parts of the building.
108. See U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361, 367-68 (5th Cir. 1987).
109. See id. at 368 ("The relevant inquiry.., is... whether society views them as electrical
installations.").
110. Id.
111. 117 F.3d 909 (5th Cir. 1997). But see Boggs v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 72 (E.D.
La. 1989). The court declared: "Because it is undisputed that the H & P rig at issue here could be and
was removed without substantial damage to itself or to the platform to which it was attached, it cannot
be deemed part of the building owned by Arco for purposes of Article 2322 liability." Id. at 75.
112. Coulterv. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1997). These are the same scholars and
the same works that Judge Wiener sought to discredit two years later in Prytania Park Hotel v. General
Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999); see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
113. Coulter, 117 F.3d at 917.
114. It is noteworthy that the court considered substantial damage not as an absolute, but as
relative to that which is incurred in the offshore drilling i dustry. See id.
115. Seeid.at918.
116. See id.
117. See Equibank v. I.R.S., 749 F.2d 1176, 1180 (5th Cir. 1985) ("an installed ight fixture, be





RULING FROM THE TOP OF MOUNT OLYMPUS
Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indemnity Co." 9 would have been an
unremarkable case if it were not for Judge Wiener's opinion that turned it into the
antipode of Equibank. According to a typical standard form insurance policy,
damaged personal property, including "furniture and fixtures," 2 ' should be replaced
at actual cash value and "permanently installed [f]ixtures" in the building should be
replaced at full replacement cost. Furniture attached to the walls of the hotel by
screws and bolts, consisting of armoires, night desks, entertainment centers, chests
of drawers, desks, wall mirrors, and hanging luggage racks were damaged in
a fire and policy holders, relying on the permanently installed fixtures
coverage, sought replacement at full replacement cost. However, the insurance
company relied on the furniture and fixture coverage and proposed replacement at
actual cash value.
In various proceedings, three federal district court judges interpreted the
insurance policy to mean that the furniture in question was, according to the intent
of the parties, permanently installed fixtures that should be replaced at full
replacement cost. 2' The United. States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
disagreed with that interpretation of the policy and reversed on the grounds that the
furniture in question was not "fixtures"' 22 under the building coverage, and, in the
alternative, if the furniture was "fixtures," it was not "permanently attached."
118. "Paroxysmal jurisprudence, indulged in by temporarily misled judges" was a favorite
expression of a distinguished Louisiana jurist, Col. John H. Tucker, Jr. See Thomas B. Lemann, John
Tucker the Man-a Personal Memoir, 45 La. L. Rev. 1027 (1985). For the dictionary meaning of
paroxysmal, see The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1996): "1. A
sudden outburst of emotion or action; a paroxysm of laughter. 2. Medicine. a. A sudden attack,
recurrence, or intensification of a disease. b. A spasm or fit; a convulsion."
119. 179F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999).
120. The word "fixtures" is not found in the Louisiana Civil Code. For the nebulous meaning of
this word in common law jurisdictions, see 2 Yiannopoulos, Property § 11l, at 225, in Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991). In Louisiana, component parts of buildings or other constructions may be
"fixtures" under Chapter 9 of the commercial laws (La. R.S. 10:9-101 to 10:9-605 (1993)). The rules
relating to fixtures determine when and under which circumstances a security interest continues to exist
on the goods after they become component parts of an immovable and what priority the security interest
may have with regard to interests in or over the immovable. For the right to remove fixtures, see La.
R.S. 10:9-313(8) (1993).
121. See Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indem. Co., 896 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La. 1995);
Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indem. Co., No. 94-3743, 1996 WL 194930 (E.D. La. Apr. 22,
1996); Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indem. Co., 1997 WL 66774 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 1997); id.
1996 WL 560349 (E.D. La. Sept. 30,1996); Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indem. Co., 1997 WL
250037 (E.D. La. May 9, 1997).
122. The word "fixtures" is used at least 69 times in the court's opinion. The court thought that
this word is neither a technical term nor a term of art but proceeded to enumerate kinds of fixtures in
commercial establishments. See Prytania Park Hotel, 179 F.3d at 175. Amazingly, the court did not
search for the meaning of the word at common law nor in standard insurance policies. But see
Equibank, 749 F.2d at 1176.
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Accordingly, the replacement value should be the depreciated actual cash value
rather than full replacement cost.
That might have been all, but Judge Wiener chose to write a confusing diatribe
on Article 466 of the Louisiana Civil Code and besmear the integrity of two
Louisiana scholars in an unprovoked, unprecedented and unnecessary ad hominem
attack. As a matter of contractual interpretation, Prytania, like any other fact based
decision, has little precedential value and commentary is unnecessary.' However,
the alternative ground of decision, the arguendo diatribe on Article 466 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, calls for a critique because of its potential precedential value.
Louisiana courts, deeply influenced by civilian methodology, quite often fail to
distinguish between obiter dicta and holding, and there is danger that erroneous or
uncritical pronouncements inPrytania might be taken as true statements of Louisiana
law.
Once the question of contractual interpretation was turned into a question of
statutory interpretation, that is, whether the furniture in question was permanently
attached to the building under Article 466 of the Civil Code, the court proceeded to
an examination of the derivation and structure of that article. The court thought that
furniture, unless regarded as "electrical or other installations," was not of the kind
of things that qualify as permanently attached under the first paragraph of that
article. 24 The question, therefore, was whether the furniture was a component part
of the building under the first paragraph as an installation or whether it was a
component part under the test of the second paragraph of Article 466.
Contrary to well settled Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrine, including federal
court decisions, Judge Wiener asserted that the first and the second paragraphs of
Article 466 must be read together, and installations, in order to be component parts,
must also meet the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 466.121 In the
123. While belaboring the obvious, the scheme of contractual interpretation established by La. Civ.
Code arts. 2047-2057, the court sought to teach the three lower court judges a lesson in contractual
interpretation and in the proper use of the "methodology of the Civil Code." See Prytania Park Hotel,
179 F.3d at 175. However, the court did not realize the difference between the rules of interpretation
of the Civil Code and civilian "methods of interpretation." See Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System,
Louisiana and Comparative Law §§135, 140-143 (2d ed. 1999).
124. The court seemed to be unaware that La. Civ. Code art. 466 is susceptible of application by
analogy. It appeared to be influenced by the common law rule of ejusdem generis. For Louisiana law,
see Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F.2d 139-41 (5th Cir. 1934) which states:
A sprinkler system... is not included in the enumeration of specified appliances of either
article [467 and 468], but, as the maxim 'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius'has very little
application in construing the articles of the Civil Code, it may be conceded that either article
is broad enough to include the sprinkling system by necessary implication.
(citing Scott v. Brennan, 161 La. 1017,109 So. 822,48 A.L. R. 1143 (1926)); see also, American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) ("The Equibank case
may also be applied by analogy, to include the carpeting which was installed, and subsequently
removed .... ").
125. See Prytania Park Hotel, 179 F.3d at 178 stating:
A straightforward reading of Article 466 requires that the permanence of any movable's
installation in 'a building or other construction' meet the definition of 'permanently
attached' in the article's second paragraph. Under that definition, the Furniture can only
qualify as '[p]ermanently installed [flixtures' if its removal would cause 'substantial
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absence of a genuine dispute as to facts, the court concluded that, as a matter of law,
the furniture was not permanently attached to the building.'
26
A. The Mythology of "Societal Expectations"
When by the craft of Hephaestus
And his axe of beaten bronze
From the top of her father's head
Athene jumped out, and yelled with a monstrous shout
And the sky shuddered at her, and Mother Earth.'
Since Equibank, both state and federal courts in Louisiana resolved
disputes as to the status of diverse objects attached to buildings and other
structures with reference to "societal expectations."' 28 In Coulter v. Texaco,
Judge Wiener claimed ownership and perhaps paternity of the notion of
"societal expectations" on behalf of the Fifth Circuit, declaring proudly that
"intermediate appellate courts in Louisiana have applied our Equibank 'ordinary
societal expectations' test in a number of cases."'29 Two years later, however, Judge
Wiener in Prytania disavowed paternity, disclaimed ownership, and overruling
himself sought to attach paternity of societal expectations to others. 30 He asserted
that "[w]e are aware from Equibank that the societal expectations canon sprang-or
more accurately, was launched-full-grown from the forehead of an expert witness
who testified for the I.R.S. during the trial of that case."' He considers that
damage' to itself or to the Hotel.
But see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
126. The court found error in the lower court's finding that the things in question were component
parts as a matter of law, but this was not a deterrent to rule on appeal that the same objects were
movables as a matter of law. To paraphrase Judge Wiener's sarcasm in Prytania, the court "was not,
as might have been expected, a building contractor, electrical contractor, architect, or engineer,
testifying about the extent of collateral damage that removal of the movables in question had caused,"
but could, nevertheless, rule that the things in question, unlike the Equibank chandeliers, were
movables. See Prytania Park Hotel, 179 F.3d at 180-81.
127. C. M. Bowra, Pindar 222 (1964).
128. See Hyman v. Ross, 643 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994); Lakeside Nat'l Bank of Lake
Charles v. Moreaux, 576 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-
Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909 (5th Cir.
1997); U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361, (5th Cir. 1987); Miller v. Slam
Offshore, 49 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. La. 1999); Moll v. Brown & Root, Inc., No. 97-2671, 1999 WL
155948 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 1999). See also Vintage Petroleum, Inc. v. Riverside Pipeline Co., No. 93-
1497, 1994 WL 449385 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1994).
129. Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
130. "Although Judge Politz's opinion in Equibank has been cited by other courts as this court's
acceptance of the 'societal expectations' methodology advanced by Professor Yiannopoulos, a careful
reading of that opinion demonstrates anything but acceptance." Prytania Park Hotel, 179 F. 3d at 182,
n.35. Query: Was the Coulter court "another court" that ... did not accept the notion of "societal
expectations"? But see Coulter, 117 F.3d at 909.
131. Prytania Park Hotel, 179 F. 3d at 180. The allusion is, of course, to Athena who jumped
fully grown and armed from the top of the head of Zeus. The cranial anatomy error is not a reversible
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"canon""' to be a spurious invention of a professor bent on distorting the law
in order to serve the interests of his client,' reinforced by a second
professor who, for reasons not specified, sought to support the unsupportable
views of the first.34 Apparently, neither Judge Wiener nor his clerks carried a
thorough search to determine "the pedigree"'35 of societal expectations. Had they
done so, they would have found that the phrase "societal expectations" was first
coined by Judge Tate in Lafleur v. Foret 136 and was picked up by Judge Politz in
Equibank from that opinion.
Prytania to the contrary notwithstanding, the "societal expectations" analysis is
now part of Louisiana jurisprudence constante, and a most useful tool carefully
applied by state and federal courts. "' This jurisprudence is a part of Louisiana law
that federal courts are Erie bound to follow and apply in diversity cases for the
determination of the question of whether an object is a component part of a building
or other structure. 38
error. However, the court is plainly wrong concerning the genealogy of the societal expectations. These
words are not found in the transcript of the Reporter's testimony at the Equibank trial. In the Exposi
des Motifs of the 1978 Revision, in the Property Treatise, and at the Equibank trial, the Reporter spoke
of "prevailing notions in society" for the classification of things as movables and immovable at the
fringes. This terminology has been borrowed from doctrinal works elaborating on the legal systems of
Greece and Germany, on which the 1978 Revision relied heavily. See Expose des Motifs, Title I,
Things; 2 Yiannopoulos, Property §32, at 56-57 in Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991).
132. Prytania Park Hotel, 179 F.3d at 180. It is not clear whether "canon" means in context rule
or gun (artillery).
133. See id. at 181 stating:
From our opinion in Equibank, we get the impression that the Professor had opted to
disregard the concept of permanent attachment as embodied in the plain wording of article
466 (a concept that presumably favored his client, given the apparent dearth of trial evidence
of 'substantial damage' to the chandelier or the mansion during removal) and to ground his
advocacy instead on "societal expectations." He did so by an imaginative parsing of this
article to visualize an otherwise invisible disjunctive between the article's first and second
paragraphs.
Id.
134. "In fact only the post-hoc effort of the Professor's fellow academician, Professor Symeon
Symeonides of the LS.U. Law faculty purports to support the proposition that in 1978 Louisiana had
adopted the societal expectations theory, and even that writing fails to withstand careful scrutiny." Id.
at 181,n.34.
135. But see id. "The pedigree of the Professor's 'societal expectations' canon is murky at best."
136. See Lafleurv. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). See also U.S. E.P.A. v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361,366 n.8 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Lafleur was the only case cited by the
court in Equibank, and undoubtedly served as the basis for the reference to societal expectations in the
classification of the things as movable or immovable.").
137. But see Hargrave, supra note 27, at 362 (Shel-Boze and Equibank "reflect Judge Tate's
opinion in Lafleur v. Foret, in which he referred to 'contemporary views' as to conceptions of
components in light of current building technology with respect to components of residences, and
moved away from old cases that allowed virtual denuding of houses upon sale.") (citations ommitted)
138. See, e.g., Hyman v. Ross, 643 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994); Lakeside Nat'l Bank of
Lake Charles v. Moreaux, 576 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. I st Cir. 1988); Coulter v. Texaco Inc., 117 F.3d 909 (5th
Cir. 1997); U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987); Miller v. Slam
Offshore, 49 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. La. 1999); Moll v. Brown & Root, Inc., No. 97-2671, 1999 WL
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
1. The question of the classification of things attached to a building or other
structure as component parts or movables is an ever-recurring problem that involves
significant consequences in many fields of law. Articles 465 through 467 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, as revised in 1978, are sufficiently broad to provide certainty
in the law and resolve most disputes in and out of court. However, as all other civil
codes, the Louisiana Civil Code cannot literally cover all possible fact situations and
circumstances. At the fringes of the law, the classification of things as movables and
immovables, that is, distinct things or component parts of another thing, will be made
in accordance with rules of interpretation, civilian methodology, doctrine, and
notions prevailing in society.
2. Article 466 of the Louisiana Civil Code did not spring fully grown from the
forehead of anyone. Its first paragraph is based on Article 467 of the 1870 Civil
Code and the second paragraph reproduces the substance of Article 469 of the same
Code. It is a "historical accident' ' 9 that in the late stages of the 1978 Revision two
distinct draft articles were combined to form Article 466.4
3. The legislative intent was that Article 466 be interpreted in light of the
pre-existing jurisprudence. Accordingly, the determination of the status of
things under the first paragraph is made by the court "as a matter of law,'
' 4
'
as it was made under Article 467 of the 1870 Code. There is no need of
proof, lay or expert testimony, concerning the mode, scope, and purpose of
attachment of a movable to a building or other structure. 42 If the thing
belongs to one of the enumerated categories, it is a component part. However, the
enumeration is not exclusive and it may well be expanded by analogy. 43 In case of
doubt, the court almost unavoidably will rely on prevailing notions in society.
Therefore, many kinds of "installations," not only similar to those enumerated and
not only electrical, may qualify as component parts of a building or other structure
without regard to the test of permanent attachment under the second paragraph of
Article 466.
4. The determination of the status of things under the second paragraph of
Article 466 is a legal conclusion grounded on facts, as it was under Article 469 of the
1870 Code. Therefore, a thing is a component part of a building or other structure
when its removal will likely cause damage to itself or to the building. In case of
doubt, reliance on prevailing notions in society may be unavoidable for determina-
tion of whether the attachment is permanent.'"
155948 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 1999).
139. Symeonides, supra note 27, at 687.
140. See Louisiana State Law Institute, Council Meeting, Nov. 5 and 6, 1971 (Draft Articles 17
and 18); id. Council Meeting, Oct. 9 and 30, 1976 (Draft Articles 17 and 18).
141. U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361,368 (Sth Cir. 1987).
142. Id. ("It would be absurd to require such testimony.").
143. See supra text accompanying note 79.
144. "[S]uch a determination can, and should be made by the trier of fact, on a case by case basis."
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5. For nearly twenty years, Louisiana courts have generally reached plausible
results in the interpretation and application of the two paragraphs Article 466 of the
Civil Code, guided in doubtful cases by an objective test of societal expectations.
That notion, the brainchild of one of Louisiana's greatest jurists, Justice Albert Tate,
Jr., has been thoughtfully and consistently applied by state and federal courts in
Louisiana. The well settled jurisprudence may be regarded as jurisprudence
constante, indisputably a part of Louisiana property law that all courts must respect.
The aspersions of one judge do not herald a decline in judicial ethos and an era of
chaos and uncertainty.
6. Law professors may be frustrated because they have no authority to decide
cases. Judges decide cases, and, whether frustrated or not, may also write treatises,
dissertations and diatribes. It may be a good idea for judges to keep the functions
separate. Judicial decisions command respect and deference even if they are
erroneous. A diatribe, however, even if dressed as a judicial decision, is an academic
exercise and it may provoke the kind of critique that normally is encountered in
doctrinal controversies. This may detract from the high respect that is due to courts
and their judgments under our system of government and prevailing notions in
society.
U.S. E.P.A. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361,368 (5th Cir.1987).
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